# 1NC

## Off

**Hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible both for every atrocity in the 20th century as well as the exacerbation of every modern geopolitical crisis**

**Cunningham 13** (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

The affirmative’s securitizing logic manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

The alternative is to deterritorialize the 1AC through a historical and critical lens – rather than objectively approaching their threat discourse, we choose more diverse forms of analysis

Krause and Williams 97 (Keith Krause, professor of political science at the Graduate Institute on International and Development Studies, Michael C Williams, professor of international relations at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, “From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,” chapter 2 of Critical Security Studies, p 49-50)

The challenges to the conventional understanding of security and the object to be secured also necessitate an epistemological shift in the way security is to be understood and studied. What is involved is a shift in focus from abstract individualism and contractual sovereignty to a stress on culture, civilization, and identity; the role of ideas, norms, and values in the constitution of that which is to be secured; and the historical context within which this process takes place. Epistemologically, this involves moving away from the objectivist, rationalist approach of both neorealism and neoliberalism, and toward more interpretive modes of analysis. While these issues have gained some prominence in debates over the nature of regime theory and the study of international organizations, they have made little impact on security studies.51 This is clearly illustrated by Helga Haftendorn’s attempts to broaden the ambit of security studies. On method, she concludes that the goal of security studies is “to construct an empirically testable paradigm,” which involves defining the “set of observational hypotheses,” the “hard core of irrefutable assumptions,” and the “‘set of scope conditions’ that…are required for a ‘progressive’ research program.” Although she admits that “we might do well to follow [Robert] Keohane’s counsel to apply somewhat ‘softer,’ more interpretive standards,” there is little room in this approach for studying norm change and the role of ideational elements in *constituting* the historical context within which actors take specific decisions.52 Despite Haftendorn’s goal of incorporating new issues that are normatively driven, the subordination of normative and reflexive conceptions of agency to objectivist visions of method remains largely undisturbed, and she remains committed to the fact value distinction. To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53 New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for example, was both a central structuring practice of latemedieval conflict and a central object that was to be secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to misunderstand it in both form and content.55 The shift to interpretive models of understanding (broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices. As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable). But if we are to understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56

**Every affirmation is fundamentally a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – their attempt to elevate their particular method of decision to the status of metaphysics links to all of our offense and begs the question of their justification for exclusion**

**Dillon, 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

**[] The dawn of the nuclear age for the first time un-brackets the possibility of human extinction through security**

Dillon 96

(Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR at the University of Lancaster, Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster.  He has published widely in international relations and in cultural and political theory. He is currently researching the problematisation of security and war from the perspective of continental philosophy with particular interest in what happens to the problematisation of security when security discourses and technologies take life rather than sovereign territoriality as their referent object. Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought.pg. 27)

Metaphysics, therefore, becomes material in politics of security because metaphysically determined being has a foundational requirement to secure security. Hence our (inter)national politics of security are the municipal metaphysics of the Western tradition. That is why the fate of metaphysics and the fate of that politics of security are so inextricably intertwined. There is more than an academic interest at stake, therefore, in this modern conjunction between the philosophical and the political. How we think and what we do, what we think and how we are doing, condition one another. There is clearly more than a coincidence also in relying upon post-Nietzschean thought to argue for that reappraisal of both which requires a recovery of the question of the political. For between Hegel and Heidegger metaphysics exposed itself to its own deconstructive impulses. After Marx 'one finds Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Freud, and Nietzsche turning philosophy upon itself, thereby unmasking its own taboos and twisted roots; realising and exhausting its potential, according to Heidegger, in the advent of the epoch of technology. The same period also witnessed the exhaustion of the European State system's modern metaphysical resolution of the question of the political - its profoundly ambiguous and deeply problematic inauguration as both a State of emergency and a certain kind of democratic project - through the very globalisation of the language, forms and practices of the politics of security upon which it was based. The advent of the globalised industrial nuclear age exhibits not only the hollowness of that system's foundational promises to secure order, identity and freedom - hence the reason why the disciplines which promise to tell the truth about the operation of its orders and identities appear to be so peculiarly limited and unreal in their vaunted realistic representation of reality - but also, in the gulf that exists between what its (inter)national political prospectus offers and what its (inter)national politics provides; the exhaustion of its political imagination. For this was a period, in which World War One was critical, when that (inter)national politics of security finally realised the full potential of the self-immolative dynamic pre-figured in its very inception; the real prospect of human species extinction.

## Off

**A. Interpretation – toward means in the direction of**

Michigan Supreme Court 1914 [Michigan Reports: Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan, Volume 180, Google Books]

Under 3 Comp. Laws, § 11510 (5 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 14559), providing that “any person who shall discharge without injury to any other person, any firearm, while intentionally, without malice, aimed at or toward any person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc., acts carelessly done, without design to do mischief, are punishable.¶ 2. Same—“Toward”—Construction of Statute.¶ It is sufficient, in a prosecution for violating the statute, to show that the accused was making use of a rifle pointed in the direction of a passenger on a car and discharged the weapon in that direction, without striking any one. The word “toward” means in a course or line leading in the direction of.

## Case

## 1NC – Ex-Im

**Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end**

Crist, 7(Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Alt cause to warming – inevitable methane burps speed up global warming – no risk of solvency

Bara, 7/25

Kukil Bara, citing many authors and studies that are underlined in the evidence, “Cost Of A Likely Giant ‘Burp’ Of Arctic Methane Could Equal Size Of World Economy In 2012,” 7/25/13, <http://www.ibtimes.com/cost-likely-giant-burp-arctic-methane-could-equal-size-world-economy-2012-1359639> //BGHS-IS

“The global impact of a warming Arctic is an economic time-bomb,” Gail Whiteman, professor of sustainability, management and climate change in the Rotterdam School of Management, or RMS, at Erasmus University in the Netherlands, said in a statement, on Wednesday. Whiteman said that global leaders, and international organizations such as the World Economic Forum and the International Monetary Fund need to pay more attention to the Arctic methane projections. “The mean impacts of just this one effect -- $60 trillion -- approaches the $70-trillion value of the world economy in 2012,” she said. According to the research, conducted by scientists at RSM and the University of Cambridge, Arctic sea ice is melting at an unprecedented rate as the North Pole warms -- a phenomenon that leads to thawing of offshore frozen soil and an emission of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas. Earlier studies have revealed that there are huge reservoirs of methane in the Arctic, containing hundreds of billions of tonnes of the gas, which is more potent than carbon dioxide in creating global warming conditions. The new research in question, published in the journal Nature, on Thursday, said that methane below the East Siberian Sea -- some 50 billion tonnes -- is likely to be emitted either steadily over the next 30 years, or in one giant “burp,” which could have a global impact of trillions of dollars. The results were achieved using a modeling method called “PAGE09,” which is currently used by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. An earlier version of the method was used for the UK Government’s Stern Review in 2006. “The methane release would bring forward the date at which the global mean temperature rise exceeds 2 degrees C by between 15 and 35 years,” Chris Hope, reader in Policy Modeling at the Cambridge Judge Business School in the University of Cambridge, said in the statement. While the economic impact discussed in the study only accounted for the methane existing on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, if other impacts, such as ocean acidification are factored in, the total price of Arctic warming could be much higher, according to the study. Moreover, the scientists noted, some 80 percent of these costs will be borne by developing countries, as they experience more extreme weather, flooding, droughts and poorer health over the coming years.

**[] The global climate is cooling and warming isn’t anthropogenic**

Easterbrook, 8 (Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University. Bellingham, WA; “Global Cooling is Here: Evidence for Predicting Global Cooling for the Next Three Decades,” 11/2/2008, http://www.globalresearch.ca/global-cooling-is-here/) [Images omitted]

Despite no global warming in 10 years and recording setting cold in 2007-2008, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change (IPCC) and computer modelers who believe that CO2 is the cause of global warming still predict the Earth is in store for catastrophic warming in this century. IPCC computer models have predicted global warming of 1° F per decade and 5-6° C (10-11° F) by 2100 (Fig. 1), which would cause global catastrophe with ramifications for human life, natural habitat, energy and water resources, and food production. All of this is predicated on the assumption that global warming is caused by increasing atmospheric CO2 and that CO2 will continue to rise rapidly. Figure 1. A. IPCC prediction of global warming early in the 21st century. B. IPCC prediction of global warming to 2100. (Sources: IPCC website) However, records of past climate changes suggest an altogether different scenario for the 21st century. Rather than drastic global warming at a rate of 0.5 ° C (1° F) per decade, historic records of past natural cycles suggest global cooling for the first several decades of the 21st century to about 2030, followed by global warming from about 2030 to about 2060, and renewed global cooling from 2060 to 2090 (Easterbrook, D.J., 2005, 2006a, b, 2007, 2008a, b); Easterbrook and Kovanen, 2000, 2001). Climatic fluctuations over the past several hundred years suggest ~30 year climatic cycles of global warming and cooling, on a general rising trend from the Little Ice Age. PREDICTIONS BASED ON PAST CLIMATE PATTERNS Global climate changes have been far more intense (12 to 20 times as intense in some cases) than the global warming of the past century, and they took place in as little as 20–100 years. Global warming of the past century (0.8° C) is virtually insignificant when compared to the magnitude of at least 10 global climate changes in the past 15,000 years. None of these sudden global climate changes could possibly have been caused by human CO2 input to the atmosphere because they all took place long before anthropogenic CO2 emissions began. The cause of the ten earlier ‘natural’ climate changes was most likely the same as the cause of global warming from 1977 to 1998. Figure 2. Climate changes in the past 17,000 years from the GISP2 Greenland ice core. Red = warming, blue = cooling. (Modified from Cuffy and Clow, 1997) Climatic fluctuations over the past several hundred years suggest ~30 year climatic cycles of global warming and cooling (Figure 3) on a generally rising trend from the Little Ice Age about 500 years ago. Figure 3. Alternating warm and cool cycles since 1470 AD. Blue = cool, red = warm. Based on oxygen isotope ratios from the GISP2 Greenland ice core. Relationships between glacial fluctuations, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, and global climate change. After several decades of studying alpine glacier fluctuations in the North Cascade Range, my research showed a distinct pattern of glacial advances and retreats (the Glacial Decadal Oscillation, GDO) that correlated well with climate records. In 1992, Mantua published the Pacific Decadal Oscillation curve showing warming and cooling of the Pacific Ocean that correlated remarkably well with glacial fluctuations. Both the GDA and the PDO matched global temperature records and were obviously related (Fig. 4). All but the latest 30 years of changes occurred prior to significant CO2 emissions so they were clearly unrelated to atmospheric CO2. Figure 4. Correspondence of the GDO, PDO, and global temperature variations. The significance of the correlation between the GDO, PDO, and global temperature is that once this connection has been made, climatic changes during the past century can be understood, and the pattern of glacial and climatic fluctuations over the past millennia can be reconstructed. These patterns can then be used to project climatic changes in the future. Using the pattern established for the past several hundred years, in 1998 I projected the temperature curve for the past century into the next century and came up with curve ‘A’ in Figure 5 as an approximation of what might be in store for the world if the pattern of past climate changes continued. Ironically, that prediction was made in the warmest year of the past three decades and at the acme of the 1977-1998 warm period. At that time, the projected curved indicated global cooling beginning about 2005 ± 3-5 years until about 2030, then renewed warming from about 2030 to about 2060 (unrelated to CO2—just continuation of the natural cycle), then another cool period from about 2060 to about 2090. This was admittedly an approximation, but it was radically different from the 1° F per decade warming called for by the IPCC. Because the prediction was so different from the IPCC prediction, time would obviously show which projection was ultimately correct. Now a decade later, the global climate has not warmed 1° F as forecast by the IPCC but has cooled slightly until 2007-08 when global temperatures turned sharply downward. In 2008, NASA satellite imagery (Figure 6) confirmed that the Pacific Ocean had switched from the warm mode it had been in since 1977 to its cool mode, similar to that of the 1945-1977 global cooling period. The shift strongly suggests that **the next several decades will be cooler, not warmer as predicted by the IPCC**. Figure 5. Global temperature projection for the coming century, based on warming/cooling cycles of the past several centuries. ‘A’ projection based on assuming next cool phase will be similar to the 1945-1977 cool phase. ‘B’ projection based on assuming next cool phase will be similar to the 1880-1915 cool phase. The predicted warm cycle from 2030 to 2060 is based on projection of the 1977 to 1998 warm phase and the cooling phase from 2060 to 2090 is based on projection of the 1945 to 1977 cool cycle. Implications of PDO, NAO, GDO, and sun spot cycles for global climate in coming decades The IPCC prediction of global temperatures, 1° F warmer by 2011 and 2° F by 2038 (Fig. 1), stand little chance of being correct. NASA’s imagery showing that the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) has shifted to its cool phase is right on schedule as predicted by past climate and PDO changes (Easterbrook, 2001, 2006, 2007). The PDO typically lasts 25-30 years and assures North America of cool, wetter climates during its cool phases and warmer, drier climates during its warm phases. The establishment of the cool PDO, together with similar cooling of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), virtually assures several decades of global cooling and the end of the past 30-year warm phase. It also means that the IPCC predictions of catastrophic global warming this century were highly inaccurate. The switch of PDO cool mode to warm mode in 1977 initiated several decades of global warming. The PDO has now switched from its warm mode (where it had been since 1977) into its cool mode. As shown on the graph above, each time this had happened in the past century, global temperature has followed. The upper map shows cool ocean temperatures in blue (note the North American west coast). The lower diagram shows how the PDO has switched back and forth from warm to cool modes in the past century, each time causing global temperature to follow. Comparisons of historic global climate warming and cooling over the past century with PDO and NAO oscillations, glacial fluctuations, and sun spot activity show strong correlations and provide a solid data base for future climate change projections. The Pacific Ocean has a warm temperature mode and a cool temperature mode, and in the past century, has switched back forth between these two modes every 25-30 years (known as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation or PDO). In 1977 the Pacific abruptly shifted from its cool mode (where it had been since about 1945) into its warm mode, and this initiated global warming from 1977 to 1998. The correlation between the PDO and global climate is well established. The announcement by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory that the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) had shifted to its cool phase is right on schedule as predicted by past climate and PDO changes (Easterbrook, 2001, 2006, 2007). The PDO typically lasts 25-30 years and assures North America of cool, wetter climates during its cool phases and warmer, drier climates during its warm phases. The establishment of the cool PDO, together with similar cooling of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), virtually assures several decades of global cooling and the end of the past 30-year warm phase. Comparisons of historic global climate warming and cooling over the past century with PDO and NAO oscillations, glacial fluctuations, and sun spot activity show strong correlations and provide a solid data base for future climate change projections. As shown by the historic pattern of GDOs and PDOs over the past century and by corresponding global warming and cooling, the pattern is part of ongoing warm/cool cycles that last 25-30 years. The global cooling phase from 1880 to 1910, characterized by advance of glaciers worldwide, was followed by a shift to the warm-phase PDO for 30 years, global warming and rapid glacier recession. The cool-phase PDO returned in ~1945 accompanied by global cooling and glacial advance for 30 years. Shift to the warm-phase PDO in 1977 initiated global warming and recession of glaciers that persisted until 1998. Recent establishment of the PDO cool phase appeared right on target and assuming that its effect will be similar to past history, global climates can be expected to cool over the next 25-30 years. The global warming of this century is exactly in phase with the normal climatic pattern of cyclic warming and cooling and we have now switched from a warm phase to a cool phase right at the predicted time (Fig. 5).

**Doesn’t cause extinction**

**NIPCC, 11** (Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change; “Surviving the unprecedented climate change of the IPCC,” 3/8/2011, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

**[ ] Multiple barriers to clean tech**

**NREL, 10**

Natinoal renewable Energy Laboratory; “Clean Energy Policy Analyses: Analysis of the Status and Impact of Clean Energy Policies at the Local Level,” December 2010, http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49720.pdf //bghs-ms

Barriers to clean energy adoption can be financial, technical, social, or policy issues that inhibit technology adoption and behavior change. Technical and financial barriers are perhaps the barriers that are most often discussed. However, the barriers to clean energy development also include social and cultural aspects that can be just as difficult to overcome because these barriers impact how citizens and policymakers alike weigh in on the clean energy debate (Sovacool 2009). The current dialogue often does not include an adequate discussion of how our existing energy system interacts with the environment nor the impact this has on the present and future economy, thus, the national discussion surrounding the comparison of clean energy and conventional sources often occurs on an unlevel playing field (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007). Framing the dialogue around clean energy to demonstrate how benefits of clean energy technologies link to local social and cultural imperatives, which are often difficult if not impossible to quantify, may be a solution to address some of these barriers. Local governments are uniquely positioned to do so because of their knowledge of local social and cultural issues, which vary by locality.

**Data disproves hegemony impacts**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**The characterization of China has a threat robs it of subjectivity and entrenches its role as antithesis to the US**

Pan 04 – PhD in Political Science and International Relations and member of the International Studies Association ISA (Chengxin Pan: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29 Pg. 305 -307)

By now, it seems clear thatneither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S.self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists,China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security con­cerns in the current debate."62 At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China expertsthat they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us." Such an account of China, in many ways, strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinc­tionbetween the West and the Orient. Like orientalism, theU.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said points out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] 'they' become 'they' accordingly. "64

## 1NC – Ag

**Food wars are a myth – there’s zero empirical evidence**

Salehyan 7 (Idean, Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, Summer, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3922)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is **little systematic empirical evidence** that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend.

Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance

Alcock 9 (Rupert, graduated with a distinction in the MSc in Development and Security from the Department of Politics, University of Bristol in 2009, MSc dissertation prize joint winner 2009, “Speaking Food: A Discourse Analytic Study of Food Security” 2009, pdf available online, p. 10-14 MT)

Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

# 2NC

## K

Hegemonic forms of knowledge make macro-political violence inevitable – biggest proximate cause of all affirmative impacts

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy - that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community - my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87¶ What I take from Heidegger's argument - one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security - is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity - militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction - derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints - available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate - and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

4. Their framework causes passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

A solely political view of debate masks the true nature of the world and makes aff solvency impossible

Smith**,** professor of political science at the University of Wales,97(Steve, Review of International Studies, Cambridge journals online)

By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘private’). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the ‘buzz’ that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we ‘know’ things about the international political world. My main claim is that International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism’s commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very *political* view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to ‘speak truth to power’. For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace’s view of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work enquires into how the current ‘politics’ get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

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**Academic consensus goes our way – philosophical focus is the most productive way to engage IR**

**Kurki 11** (Milja Kurki, lecturer in international relations theory at Aberystwyth University, PhD from the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, 2011, “The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today”) GZ

Philosophical reflection is about gaining understanding of how knowledge is generated and structured and what its relationship is to its producer, their social context and society at large. It is about understanding the role and structure of scientific or social knowledge: how it is constructed; what objects exist in its purview; and why and how we do (or do not) come to know our objects in specific ways. This might seem a rather abstract interest; and indeed, for many, ‘meta-theoretical’ or ‘philosophy of science’ research remains a rather abstract theoretical sub-field narrowly engaged in detailed debates on epistemology, causation or prediction. Philosophically informed IR research can, however, be much more than this. Indeed, for many of its promulgators, philosophical research has arguably been a very politically and socially important, as well as potentially influential, field of study. While most philosophically inclined analysts acknowledge that meta-theory is not everything in IR, most argue it is of crucial significance in the discipline.8 This is because it shapes in crucial ways how we come to understand the world, evaluate claims about it and, indeed, interact with it. Depending on whether we are a positivist or a post-structuralist, we seek different kinds of data, ask different kinds of questions and come to engage with actors differently in ‘international politics’ (which is also conceived of in different ways).9 To use Patrick Jackson’s language: philosophical wagers matter.10 Philosophical research is not only of significance in IR scholarship, of course. It is worth remembering that some of the most well-known philosophers of science had at the heart of their inquiries questions of values and politics. Thus, Popper and Kuhn, for example, were socially and politically driven philosophers of science; and sought through their philosophical frameworks to influence the interaction of scientific practice and societal power structures.11 The same stands for logical positivists in the social sciences. Biersteker describes this well: European and American scholars embraced logical positivist, scientific behavioralism in the post-war era in part as a reaction against fascism, militarism, and communism. They were reacting against totalizing ideologies and sought a less overtly politicized philosophical basis for their research. Their liberalism stressed toleration for everything except totalizing ideologies, and their logical positivist scientific approaches provided what they viewed as a less politicized methodology for the conduct of social research.12 Murphy’s detailed study of the rise of behaviouralist peace studies confirms the same; the rise, in a specific context, of a specific type of meta-theoretical argumentation, which is deployed to a social and, in fact, ‘political’ effect in order to criticise recent social dynamics and to change the world in a preferable direction.13 There is, even when it is sidestepped by scientists or philosophers themselves (as in the case of behaviouralists), a ‘politics’ to the philosophy of science, in the sense that meta-theoretical concerns are tied up with concrete social and political debates and struggles and specific normative and political visions of both science and society, even if in indirect ways.14 This ‘political’ edge of philosophical debate has not been absent in IR scholarship, and arguably it was precisely the political role of philosophies of science that critical international theory was ‘invented’ to deal with. It is important to bear in mind that when meta-theory emerged as an important sphere of study within IR theorising in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was moved to the centre ground of IR research by a selection of key critical thinkers who politicised this area. Cox, Ashley, Ashley and Walker, Hoffman, Linklater and Steve Smith,15 for example, argued vehemently in favour of the necessity for IR to consider its philosophy of science underpinnings because of the polit­ical effects that epistemological and ontological decisions IR theorists make have on their concrete research and resultant policy proposals. Indeed, in a famous line, Steve Smith called his epistemological work the most political of his career.16

**Be skeptical of their truth claims – the academy has been hijacked by a discourse of danger**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

It is important to notice that long before the ubiquitous War on Terror made its¶ way to the top of the agenda of the international community, security had already¶ firmly established itself as a primary value in the context of a putative peace dividend¶ marking the “so-called end of the so-called Cold War.”36 A cursory glance through¶ academic and policy-oriented literatures leaves no doubt about the expansion of the¶ domains and the objects that have become security concerns. Not only situations of¶ political violence, but in effect almost everything pertaining to global life is articulated¶ as a security concern. Supplementing concerns about economic security, information¶ security, and health security, food security has emerged as the dominant way in which¶ one thinks about problems affecting food production;37 environmental security is¶ globally embraced as the starting point in thinking about the bleak future that awaits¶ the world unless consumption habits and developmental goals are transformed; human¶ security has become commonplace as the all-encompassing category to orient thought¶ and practice.38 Additionally, security is mobilized in reference to multiple sites and¶ scales. Communal, cooperative, comprehensive, collective, national, regional, and—¶ more prominently in the contemporary lexicon—the global are all referent domains of¶ security practices.¶ Demands for a more expansive understanding of security have been aided and¶ fueled by influential political figures who have called for a new understanding of the¶ meaning and nature of security, as well as by international institutions such as the¶ United Nations, which announced the need for a “conceptual breakthrough” toward¶ “incorporating the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities.”39 As the¶ range of objects to be secured were widening in official discourses, a long list of¶ dangers accompanied the list of security concerns and practices. This is a list that¶ incorporates not only ailing states—states that are referred to as being “failed” or¶ “rogue.”40 As I noted in the previous chapter, microscopic organisms, birds, and¶ chickens in the backyard, all become part and parcel of this all-encompassing and¶ constantly growing list.41

**Their solely political view of debate masks the true nature of the world and causes serial policy failure**

**Smith,** professor of political science at the University of Wales, **97** (Steve, Review of International Studies, Cambridge journals online)

By focusing on the policy debate, we restrict ourselves to the issues of the day, to the tip of the political iceberg. What politics seems to me to be crucially about is how and why some issues are made intelligible as political problems and how others are hidden below the surface (being defined as ‘economic’ or ‘cultural’ or ‘private’). In my own work I have become much more interested in this aspect of politics in the last few years. I spent a lot of time dealing with policy questions and can attest to the ‘buzz’ that this gave me both professionally and personally. But I became increasingly aware that the realm of the political that I was dealing with was in fact a very small part of what I would now see as political. I therefore spent many years working on epistemology, and in fact consider that my most political work. I am sure that William Wallace will regard this comment as proof of his central claim that I have become scholastic rather than scholarly, but I mean it absolutely. My current work enquires into how it is that we can make claims to knowledge, how it is that we ‘know’ things about the international political world. My main claim is that International Relations relies overwhelmingly on one answer to this question, namely, an empiricist epistemology allied to a positivistic methodology. This gives the academic analyst the great benefit of having a foundation for claims about what the world is like. It makes policy advice more saleable, especially when positivism’s commitment to naturalism means that the world can be presented as having certain furniture rather than other furniture. The problem is that in my view this is a flawed version of how we know things; indeed it is in fact a very *political* view of knowledge, born of the Enlightenment with an explicit political purpose. So much follows politically from being able to present the world in this way; crucially the normative assumptions of this move are hidden in a false and seductive mask of objectivity and by the very difference between statements of fact and statements of value that is implied in the call to ‘speak truth to power’. For these reasons, I think that the political is a far wider arena than does Wallace. This means that I think I am being very political when I lecture or write on epistemology. Maybe that does not seem political to those who define politics as the public arena of policy debate; but I believe that my work helps uncover the regimes of truth within which that more restricted definition of politics operates. In short, I think that Wallace’s view of politics ignores its most political aspect, namely, the production of discourses of truth which are the very processes that create the space for the narrower version of politics within which he works. My work enquires into how the current ‘politics’ get defined and what (political) interests benefit from that disarming division between the political and the non-political. In essence, how we know things determines what we see, and the public realm of politics is itself the result of a prior series of (political) epistemological moves which result in the political being seen as either natural or a matter of common sense.

Link

**The discourse of American exceptionalism creates a system of manichaeistic domination that justifies endless violence**

**Porotsky 13** (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

In Legitimizing the “War on Terror”: Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric, Joanne Esch contends that mythical discourse imbues language with power (Esch, 2010: 357). This follows the argument put forth by the previous authors mentioned, and stresses that threats are discursively constructed and intended to manufacture public consent for government policies. Esch defines political myth in terms of “Bottici’s (2007) philosophical understanding of political myth as a process of work on a common narrative that answers the human need to ground events in significance” (Esch, 2010: 357). This is in direct correlation to the tenets of securitzation theory, as it adds depth to an understanding of the various devices used in the rhetorical representation of threats. As Esch elaborates, “three key attributes distinguish a political myth from a simple narrative: First a mythical narrative provides significance. Second it is shared by a group and (re)produced at various levels. Third, it can come to affect the political conditions of the group” (Esch, 2010: 362). The deployment of mythical discourse in political rhetoric is instrumental to identifying the mechanisms influencing public opinion, and informs my discourse analysis by outlining two prominent political myths in American political discourse: American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism. These myths are particularly powerful “because they have been tools of moral justification for military violence since the Declaration of Independence” (Esch, 2010: 365). The political myth of American Exceptionalism “consists of three ideas: America is a ‘chosen nation,’ America has a ‘calling’ or ‘mission,’ and in answering that calling, America represents the forces of good against evil” (Esch, 2010: 366). These ideas are embedded throughout the government texts, and are powerful indicators of moral justifications derived from the myth of American Exceptionalism. The myth of Civilization vs. Barbarism “relates to national identity and tells of the good nature and character of Americans vis à vis the ‘evil Other’…This myth is a classic story of ‘Us versus Them’ that favors cultural or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones” (Esch, 2010: 370). It becomes apparent how this myth can be utilized to obscure enemy grievances, while simultaneously dehumanizing them by denying them qualities of ‘civilized’ people. Esch accentuates the power of these myths, precisely because they are often invisible yet ubiquitous (Esch, 2010: 357). During my discourse analysis of Bush texts, I found that nearly every third sentence contained language linked to one of these political myths. Esch argues that these political myths were staples in the “War on Terror” discourse, and that political elites have “rhetorically accessed these mythical representations of the world in ways that legitimize and normalize the practices of the ‘War on Terror’” (Esch, 2010: 357). Esch provides an important piece of the puzzle in answering the question of how the administration was able to use the threats it constructed to justify its actions: actions which amounted to a preventive war, unprecedented executive power, and very questionable human rights practices.

**Unipolarity makes conflict inevitable – the universalization of American norms through hegemony renders impotent all acts of resistance but violence**

**Mouffe 7** Chantal Mouffe, Professor of Political Theory at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster, 2007, “Carl Schmitt’s warning on the dangers of a unipolar world,” in The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt, Edited by: Odysseos and Petito, p. 152

I submit that it is high time to acknowledge the pluralist character of the world and to relinquish the Eurocentric tenet that modernization can only take place through Westernization. We should relinquish the illusion that antagonisms could be eliminated through unification of the world, achieved by transcending the political, conflict and negativity. It is also necessary to abandon the idea that the aim of politics is to establish consensus on one single model. The central problem that our current unipolar world is facing is that it is impossible for antagonisms to find legitimate forms of expression. It is no wonder, then, that those antagonisms, when they emerge, take extreme forms, putting into question the very structure of the existing international order. It is, in my view, the lack of political channels for challenging the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of globalization which is at the origin of the proliferation of discourses and practices of radical negation of the established order. In order to create channels for the legitimate expression of dissent we need to envisage a pluralistic world order constructed around a certain number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles.¶ The new forms of terrorism reveal the dangers implicit in the delusions of the universalist globalist discourse which postulates that human progress requires the establishment of world unity based on the adoption of the Western model. This is why, against the illusions of the universalist-humanitarians, it is urgent to listen to Schmitt when he reminds us that ‘[t]he political world is a pluriverse, not a universe’ (Schmitt 1976: 53). This is, I believe, the only way to avoid the ‘clash of civilizations’ announced by Huntington (1996) and to which, despite its intentions, the universalist discourse is, in fact, contributing.

## Ex-Im

**More evidence – international complexity proves and other things solve**

**Preble 12** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

Kagan returns to both this theme and Adams’s quote in *The World America Made*. America’s conception of itself as the reluctant sheriff, unwilling to go out in search of trouble but willing to defend the town only when called upon, “bears no relation to reality,” he explains. “Americans have used force dozens of times, and rarely because they had no choice.” But the world is too complex to be policed by a single global sheriff, and it need not be. Instead, the many beneficiaries of the current order should contribute to the preservation of that order at a level, and in a manner, that is consistent with their interests. By that standard, the United States would retain military power that was at least three or four times greater than that of its closest rivals, but it would no longer presume to be responsible for countries that can take care of themselves. Americans must learn to embrace their relative security and face down their lingering fears. Until they do so, the fear of the unknown works in Kagan’s favor. It is difficult to disentangle the many different factors that have contributed to relative peace and security over the past half century, and it is impossible to know what would have happened in a world without America. The future is even more inscrutable. In this latest book, Kagan surveys all the explanations for what may have contributed to global peace and prosperity—including the spread of democracy, liberal economics, nuclear weapons, and evolving global norms against violence and war—and returns to his refrain from sixteen years earlier. “American hegemony,” he and Kristol wrote in 1996, “is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.” Fast-forward to 2012, and nothing, it seems, has changed: *There can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace. . . . If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel.* He didn’t prove that case before, and he doesn’t now.

**Decline is smooth**

**Preble 12** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive.